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AN INDUSTRY MISSING MINORITIES: THE DISPARATE IMPACT




Employers in the United States must be careful to comply with the
numerous laws and regulations enacted by the government to protect em-
ployees.1 Employers whose businesses are subject to regulation by indus-
try-specific federal agencies created to protect the public interest 2 face the
further burden of compliance with the applicable rules and regulations of
their respective industries. Given the vast range of federal rules and regula-
tions impacting U.S. employers, conflicts will inevitably arise, which can
create a dilemma for employers.
Employers in the securities industry face just such a dilemma as they
strive to comply with both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) requirement to disqualify
from employment any job applicants or employees who have been convict-
ed of various misdemeanors or felonies. 3 Section 15b(4)(1) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 requires that the SEC limit the activities,
including suspending privileges or revoking registrations, of any employee
or broker-dealer 4 that employs an individual who has been convicted of
certain types of misdemeanors or felonies. 5 Thus, the SEC enacted a rule
that requires the vast majority of employees in the securities industry to
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, December 2012; B.S., Finance, University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2003. The author would like to thank Professor Mary Rose Strubbe and
Aaron Midler for their guidance throughout this process. The author also wishes to thank her fianc6,
Bill, for his love and encouragement throughout law school, and her family for all their support.
1. Examples include Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and worker's compensation
laws.
2. Examples include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006).
4. A broker-dealer is a person or firm engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
the accounts of others or for their own account. §78c(a)(4-5).
5. § 78o(b)(4). Such crimes include the "purchase or sale of any security, the taking of a false
oath, the making of a false report, bribery, perjury, burglary,. . . conspiracy to commit any such of-
fense; larceny, theft, robbery, extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment, embezzlement,
fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of funds, or securities."
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submit fingerprints for a criminal history check 6 to determine whether such
employees are statutorily disqualified7 from employment. This regulation
may be in conflict with Title VII, which prohibits employment practices
that appear neutral but have a disparate impact on a particular race.8 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged
with ensuring compliance with Title VII,9 has asserted that the use of crim-
inal background checks as a method of pre-employment screening can have
a disparate impact on African Americans and Hispanics, who are more
likely to have criminal conviction records.10
The language of the SEC's fingerprint rule has not kept pace with the
changing structure of the trading industry in recent years, resulting in broad
application of the rule. Of course, ensuring the safety of financial instru-
ments and the trustworthiness of those charged with handling cash and
securities is extremely important. Yet in its current form, the fingerprint
rule goes beyond merely protecting money: it excludes many individuals
with even minor criminal histories from working in the securities indus-
try.1' In today's business environment, the rule arguably covers nearly all
positions at a trading firm despite some limiting language about the job
roles to which it applies.12
This broad application of the fingerprint rule may have a disparate im-
pact on African Americans and Hispanics in violation of Title VII. Title
VII prohibits employment practices that adversely impact a protected class
of individuals if the employment practice is not consistent with business
necessity. 13 The extensive list of offenses for which an individual is subject
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17f-2 (2010).
7. This Note will use the term "statutorily disqualified" to refer to individuals who have been
convicted of certain felonies or misdemeanors. See parenthetical supra note 5. Statutorily disqualified
will also refer to persons convicted of any other felony in the past ten years. § 78(c)(a)(39)(F). Although
persons can be statutorily disqualified for other reasons, this Note will only be looking at disqualifica-
tions resulting from criminal records.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
9. § 2000e-5(a) (2006).
10. EEOC, Facts about Race/Color Discrimination 4 (October 21, 2009), www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-
race.pdf; Compliant at 3-4, EEOC v. Freeman, 2009 WL 5082565, (D.Md. Sept. 30, 2009) No.
8:09CV02573; Complaint at 2, EEOC v. Peoplemark, 2008 WL 4733865, (S.D.Mich. Sept. 29, 2008)
No. 1:08-CV-00907.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(b)(4); § 78(c)(a)(39)(F); § 240.17f-2.
12. See § 240.17f-2(a)(1)(i) (An employee ". . . shall be exempt if that person: (A) is not engaged
in the sale of securities; [or] (B) does not regularly have access to the keeping, handling or processing
of (1) securities, (2) monies, or (3) the original books and records" of the firm). Even information
technology employees will arguably have access to the books and records of the firm and thus may fall
within the requirements of the fingerprint rule. See id
13. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) A disparate impact claim requires petitioner to show that the employment
practice at issue causes a disparate impact on a protected group; and that the practice is not related to
the job in question and a business necessity, or if the respondent demonstrates the employment practice
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to disqualification under the Securities Exchange Act and the wide array of
job functions covered by the SEC's fingerprint rule create a barrier against
working in the securities industry for many prospective employees with a
past criminal record. Notably, incarceration rates for African American and
Hispanic men are nearly 6.5 and 2.5 times greater, respectively, than incar-
ceration rates for white men. 14 Given that African Americans and Hispan-
ics are significantly more likely to have criminal records as compared to
white people,15 this rule has a greater impact on those races. Thus, employ-
ers are placed in a difficult position because compliance with the finger-
print rule could leave the employer vulnerable to claims of disparate
impact.
This Note explores the disparate impact the SEC's fingerprint rule
may have on African Americans and Hispanics. In Part I, this Note will
explain the requirements of Title VII with respect to disparate impact
claims and will examine the recent actions by the EEOC asserting that
criminal background checks as a method of pre-employment screening can
adversely impact African Americans and Hispanics. Part II will examine
the SEC's fingerprint rule and whether the technological advances in the
industry have resulted in unnecessarily broad application of the rule, be-
yond what could be legitimately considered a business necessity. Part III
proposes that the SEC's fingerprint rule may have a disparate impact on
minorities, contributing to low numbers of African Americans and Hispan-
ics in the securities industry. Finally, Part IV recommends that the SEC
narrow the scope of the fingerprint rule to achieve the intent of Section
15b(4)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act without unnecessarily excluding
minorities from the industry.
I. DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
Discrimination in employment decisions can manifest itself in a varie-
ty of ways. The most familiar and obvious form is direct discrimination.
However, the Supreme Court recognized that even facially neutral em-
ployment actions may still effectually discriminate against protected clas-
ses. 16 In recognizing disparate impact as a violation of Title VII, the
is consistent with business necessity, the petitioner must demonstrate that a less discriminatory, alterna-
tive is available.
14. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2008 Bulletin 2 (focusing on Table 2) (U.S.
Department of Justice, Revised June 30, 2010)
15. Id.
16. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (finding that a requirement that employ-
ees have a high school diploma or to pass a standard intelligence test, which disproportionately disad-
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Supreme Court provided employees protection against more subtle forms
of discrimination. 17
A. Disparate Impact Generally
The Supreme Court first recognized an employer's liability for em-
ployment practices that have a disparate impact on a protected class of
employees in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.18 Congress subsequently
codified the disparate impact ruling of Griggs in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.19 Consequently, Title VII prohibits employment practices that have a
disparate impact on a group of individuals because of the group's race,
religion, sex, or national origin.20 For example, the Supreme Court has held
that a requirement for employees at a power plant to have a high school
diploma or pass a standardized intelligence test had a disparate impact in
violation of Title VII because it disproportionately impacted African Amer-
ican employees and did not reasonably predict job performance. 21 Employ-
ers are prohibited from using these employment practices even if the
practice appears neutral and the discrimination was unintentional. 22
To demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must
first identify the particular employment practice at issue, such as a general
aptitude or physical strength test, and then demonstrate the causal connec-
tion between the practice and the adverse impact on the protected class. 23
Courts often rely on statistical evidence to demonstrate a causal connection
between a given employment practice and the adverse result. 24 The statis-
tics must demonstrate a disparity that is so substantial as to raise an infer-
ence of causation between the disparity and the employment practice. 25
Courts generally utilize either the "four-fifths" rule of statistical measure-
ment or a standard deviation test for evaluating whether an inference of
vantaged African-American employees and applicants, violated Title VII unless the tests can be shown
to be job related).
17. See id. at 432.
18. Id.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (finding
that Congress codified the disparate impact ruling of Griggs in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)).
20. § 2000e-2(k).
21. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-433.
22. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010); Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2672.
23. Lewis, 130 S.Ct. at 2197; Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2672.
24. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 978-979 (1988); Waisome v. Port
Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 948 F.2d 1370, 1375 (2d Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Vulcan Soc. Inc., 637
F.Supp.2d 77, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
25. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95, Foxworth v. Penn. State Police, 228 Fed App'x. 151, 158 (3d Cir.
2007); Vulcan Soc, Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d at 86.
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causation has been established for disparate impact cases.26 The four-fifths
test asserts that if the selection rate of any protected class is less than four-
fifths or 80 percent of the rate for the group with the highest selection rate,
the low selection rate will generally be viewed as evidence of an adverse
impact for purposes of a disparate impact claim.27 For the standard devia-
tion test, courts have used statistical tests that measure the probability that a
result is random when compared to a predicted result.28 While the courts
are not bound to rely on either test, both have been found to sufficiently
demonstrate a causal connection between an employment practice and an
adverse impact on a protected class. 29
If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of disparate
impact, Title VII provides employers an affirmative defense if the employ-
er can demonstrate the employment practice is job related and a business
necessity. 30 A business necessity may arise, for example, from the physical
or educational requirements to perform a certain job.31 To establish an em-
ployment practice as job related and a business necessity, courts have
looked closely at whether the characteristic in question is vital to the spe-
cific job role at issue. 32 Specifically, courts have distinguished between
preferences of employers or customers and a true business need.33 A re-
quirement for sales clerks to speak English may be a business necessity
because the requirement directly impacts the employee's interaction with
26. See Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dept. of Fire & Safety Services, 224 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir.
2000) (finding the four-fifths rule may be used to determine if an employment practice has an adverse
impact); Waisome, 948 F.2d at 1376 (finding the court has relied on both the four-fifths test and stand-
ard deviation analysis for evaluating adverse impact); Vulcan Soc, Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d at 86 (finding
the four-fifths test and standard deviation analysis are widely used to evaluate statistical evidence in
disparate impact cases).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D; Mems, 224 F.3d at 740.
28. See, e.g., Waisome, 948 F.2d at 1376; Vulcan Soc. Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d at 88.
29. Malave v. Potter, 320 F.3d 321, (2d Cir. 2003); Guardian Assoc of New York City Police
Department, Inc. v. Civ. Service Comm. Of N.Y., 630 F.2d. 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1980); Green v. Town of
Hamden, 73 F.Supp.2d 192, 198 (D. Conn. 1999); see also Vulcan Soc. Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d at 93.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009); EEOC
v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2006).
31. See, e.g., Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding mini-
mum aerobic capacity was necessary requirement for successful performance of position as training
cadet); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1284 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the City of Los
Angeles demonstrated an auditor examination was sufficiently relevant to the auditor position and
therefore met the requirements of the business necessity defense).
32. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (finding persons who did not
have a high school diploma and did not pass the standardized test continued to do well in their job roles
and therefore the requirement was not a business necessity); Lanning, 308 F.3d at 288 (finding mini-
mum aerobic capacity was necessary requirement for successful performance of position as training
cadet).
33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F.Supp.2d 408, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bradley v.
Paizzaco of Neb. Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993).
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customers 34 whereas a customer preference for clean-shaven pizza delivery
men is not a business necessity. 35
Further, the courts have established that to qualify as a business neces-
sity the employment practice should be predictive of job performance and
must be tailored to correctly measure the specified criteria as it applies to
the individual employee. 36 General or overly broad criteria are not accepta-
ble.37 Employers should be able to demonstrate that the business practice is
necessary for the "safe and efficient performance" of the particular job at
issue, 38 or that there is a manifest relationship between the practice and the
position in question.39 Still, a plaintiff can overcome the affirmative de-
fense of business necessity by demonstrating that an alternative, non-
discriminatory employment practice could achieve the same business-
related result.40 For example, a test that directly measures the strength of
prison guards may serve as a non-discriminatory alternative to minimum
height and weight requirements. 41
B. The Use of Criminal Background Checks
There is no clear guidance from the courts as to whether criminal
background checks violate Title VII. The Supreme Court has yet to weigh
in on the issue of criminal background checks as a pre-employment screen-
ing tool and their potential impact on minorities. Although the Supreme
Court has addressed the business necessity defense, 42 background checks
call for unique consideration because they do not specifically relate to the
individual's ability to perform the job in the way an educational require-
ment or physical strength test does. Instead, criminal background checks
raise the question of whether someone who previously committed a crime
34. See EEOC, 419 F.Supp.2d at 417 (finding requirement for sales staff to speak English when
customers are present is not merely customer preference but legitimately goes to helpfulness and ap-
proachability of employees).
35. See Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799 (finding a no-beard policy for pizza delivery drivers, while pre-
ferred by customers, was not necessary to the business and had a disparate impact on African-American
men).
36. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977)). However, disparate impact cases are fact based so a business necessity
defense must be evaluated on the merits of a particular case. Id. at 245.
37. Id at 242 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,431
(1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
38. EEOC, Fact Sheet on Employment Tests and Selection Procedures 3 (Modified June 23,
2008), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemploymentjprocedures.html.
39. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 979 (1988).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii).
41. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32.
42. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 979; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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is likely to commit a similar crime in the future and whether an employer
can choose not to assume that risk.
Many employers would be unquestionably justified in refusing to hire
persons convicted of certain types of crimes, such as extremely serious
offenseS43 or crimes with high recidivism rates. 44 Employers would likely
not be expected to assume the risk of hiring persons with these types of
convictions if the concern for the safety of others or the potential financial
loss was significant. For example, the Third Circuit held that a second de-
gree murder conviction was relevant to the successful performance of a job
as a para-transit driver because the position required the driver to be alone
with vulnerable passengers. 45 Further, an employer should be able to estab-
lish that trustworthiness is an essential characteristic for a bank teller; the
bank employer likely could justifiably refuse to hire someone with multiple
theft convictions. 46 However, the issue becomes murkier when an appli-
cant's past criminal conviction poses no threat to the safety of others,
where the crime is not relevant to the job at issue, or when the time elapsed
since the conviction raises questions as to whether the conviction itself is a
likely indicator of future behavior.47
The EEOC recognizes the dilemma faced by employers in wanting to
protect their businesses, employees, and customers by learning about the
criminal histories of prospective employees, while also attempting to avoid
any selection process that adversely impacts minority applicants. Accord-
ingly, the EEOC does not prohibit the use of background checks in pre-
employment screening and acknowledges that in certain situations the use
of criminal background checks is even mandated.48 However, the EEOC
makes clear that employers who use criminal background checks as a pre-
employment screening tool must still comply with Title VII.49
43. Examples include murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping.
44. Statistics indicate that within three years of arrest, the highest rates of recidivism occur for
persons convicted of motor vehicle theft and possession of stolen property. PATRICK A. LANAGAN &
DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 1994, 1 (U.S. Department of Justice, June 2002, NCJ 193427).
45. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242-246 (3d Cir. 2007).
46. See EEOC, Pre-Employment Inquiries and Arrest & Conviction (last visited Aug. 28, 2010),
wwwl.eeoc.gov//laws/practices/inquiries arrestconviction.cfm. An employer can lawfully refuse to
hire an applicant if employer determines person cannot be trusted to perform the duties of the job when
considering the job role and the nature and seriousness of the offense.
47. See id.
48. EEOC, supra note 10, at 4 ("Using criminal records as an employment screen may be lawful,
legitimate, and even mandated in certain circumstances.").
49. Id. ("However, employers that use criminal records to screen for employment must comply
with Title VII's non-discrimination requirements.").
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To avoid violating Title VII, employers should narrowly tailor crimi-
nal background check policies to prevent overly broad application of the
policy to unnecessary job functions or to persons convicted of irrelevant
crimes. 50 The Eighth Circuit found that a policy of refusing to hire anyone
with a conviction other than a minor traffic offense was too broad to estab-
lish a business necessity defense.5 1 When applying the business necessity
defense to criminal background checks, the Third Circuit reasoned that the
screening policy must be able to determine which applicants or employees
pose an unacceptable level of risk.52 The Third Circuit emphasized that
determinations as to the business necessity of such screening policies are
fact specific and need to be determined on a case by case basiS. 53
Generally, employers are not afforded the opportunity to gather in-
formation relating to the circumstances surrounding the past conviction
when they utilize a blanket exclusion policy for applicants with prior crim-
inal convictions. 54 The circumstances surrounding a criminal conviction
may provide clarity to an employer as to whether an individual is likely to
repeat past behaviors or whether the person simply made a mistake from
which she has learned her lesson. For example, by speaking with the em-
ployee about the criminal conviction, the employer might learn that a con-
viction for theft was a misunderstanding or regrettable choice made many
years prior. As a result, the employer would be in the position to determine
whether the criminal conviction is relevant to the job at issue. A blanket
policy of excluding job applicants with a prior criminal conviction does not
provide the employer an opportunity to make a decision that is tailored to
the job role and the individual job applicant. 55
Conversely, criminal history screenings do not violate Title VII when
tailored to fit the requirements of specific job roles and limited to convic-
tions relevant to the job in question.56 The EEOC encourages employers to
evaluate the applicant's criminal history in connection with the particular
50. EEOC, supra note 46.
51. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-1299 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding the
business necessity defense could not justifiably exclude anyone convicted of a crime other than a minor
traffic violation from every position).
52. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).
53. Id.
54. See EEOC, supra note 46 (recommending that employers allow job applicants to explain the
results of a criminal background check).
55. See El, 479 F.3d at 240 (finding that the employment practice must be tailored to measure the
specific criteria as it applies to the individual employee in order to establish a business necessity de-
fense).
56. See id. at 238-249. The Third Circuit found summary judgment appropriate where the em-
ployer dismissed a para-transit driver upon learning of a previous conviction for second degree murder
due to public safety concerns.
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job in question, the type of offense for which the applicant was convicted,
and the time elapsed since the conviction occurred.57 Further, the EEOC
recommends that employers periodically reevaluate any testing or selection
policies, such as background checks, to ensure that the requirements remain
necessary as the job roles change.58 The employer should update its policy
if it finds that its selection process is out of date and no longer applicable to
the job role at issue. 59
The difficulty of properly tailoring a criminal background check poli-
cy to comply with Title VII has recently led the EEOC to increase its focus
on the issue, particularly in light of the disparate impact such policies can
have on African Americans and Hispanics.60 In 2008 and 2009, the EEOC
filed two class action lawsuits claiming an event-planning company and a
staffing agency's broad use of criminal history records in employment
screening had an adverse impact on African American and Hispanic job
applicants and that the screening policies were not consistent with business
necessity. 61 In August 2010, Carol Miaskoff, the EEOC Assistant Legal
Counsel, stated that the EEOC sees the issue as a growing problem because
new technology has increased the ease with which employers can access
criminal history information.62 Additionally, other recently filed private
lawsuits, including cases involving a large management consulting compa-
ny and a transportation company, claim the employers' broad use of crimi-
nal background checks have a disparate impact on minorities. 63 The
increased scrutiny on this employment practice highlights the dilemma
faced by broker-dealers who have a regulatory obligation to conduct crimi-
57. EEOC, supra note 46.
58. EEOC, supra note 38, at 5 (suggesting employers update testing procedures to ensure they
remain relevant to success in the job position).
59. Id.
60. See Complaint, EEOC v. Freeman Co., supra note 10, at 3 (claiming company's use of crimi-
nal background checks as a method of pre-employment screening has a disparate impact on African-
Americans and Hispanics); EEOC, Policy Statement on the Issue of Arrest and Conviction Records
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982), (Last
Modified September 11, 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convictl.html. The EEOC's position
is that excluding prospective employees based on past criminal convictions adversely impacts African-
Americans and Hispanics.
61. See Complaint, EEOC v. Freeman Co., supra note 10; Compliant, EEOC v. Peoplemark,
supra note 10.
62. Molly McDonough, EEOC: Overusing Background Checks May Lead to Discrimination,
ABA JOURNAL, LAW NEWS Now (August 10, 2010),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/eeocoverusingbackground-checksmaylead-to-discrimina
tion/.
63. See Complaint at 1, Hudson v. First Transit, 2010 WL 2939906 (N.D.Cal. July 20, 2010) No.
C 10-03158 WHA; Complaint at 2, Arroyo et. al v. Accenture L.P, 2010 WL 1606504 (S.D.N.Y. April
8, 2010) No. IOCTV3013.
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nal history reviews and have little control over which employees are ex-
cluded as a result.
II. THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY & THE FINGERPRINT RULE
Like many industries in the United States, the securities industry is
regulated by the federal government. 64 Therefore, employers in the securi-
ties industry are not only bound by the federal laws applicable to all U.S.
employers, but they are also subject to specialized laws and regulations
applicable to their industry. This federal oversight of the securities industry
plays an essential role in ensuring the U.S. financial markets operate as
fairly and efficiently as possible. 65 However, it also imposes a unique set of
challenges and obligations on employers in the securities industry.
A. Background on the Securities Industry
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and created the
SEC in response to the stock market crash of 1929.66 Since the 1930s, the
SEC has been responsible for regulating the U.S. stock markets, the firms
and individuals who trade on those markets, and the companies that list
their stocks on a stock exchange. 67 The Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 gave the SEC the power to promulgate regulations to ensure a fair and
equitable marketplace. 68 To aid enforcement, the SEC has delegated certain
regulatory obligations to the stock exchanges. 69 As self-regulatory organi-
zations, the individual stock exchanges and independent regulatory organi-
zations can enforce the SEC regulations on market participants and are
subject to oversight by the SEC. 70
The securities markets themselves have changed dramatically since
1934. As a result, the SEC has been faced with the challenge of adapting its
rules so as to remain applicable to the evolving market structure while also
64. SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity
and Facilitates Capital Formation (Modified Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
65. Id.
66. Khandemian, Anne M., The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory Agen-




69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006).
70. See § 78o-3; SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 60 Fed. Reg. 71256 (Dec. 8,
2004).
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continuing to maintain a fair and efficient marketplace. 71 For example, in
1975 Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and encour-
aged the SEC to modify its regulations to facilitate the growth of multiple
stock exchanges, to encourage competition, and to ensure customers re-
ceived the best possible prices. 72 Consequently, the number of trading fa-
cilities available to people has exploded over the past three decades as
technology and competition have increased, and the stock markets have
shifted primarily to electronic trading.73 Today, it is estimated that over 70
percent of volume on U.S. stock markets is generated electronically. 74
B. Rule 17f-2: The Fingerprint Rule
Section 15(b)(4)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act obligates the
Securities and Exchange Commission to restrict the activities of broker-
dealers and their employees who are statutorily disqualified. 75 An individu-
al can become statutorily disqualified for violating SEC or exchange rules,
the rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or the rules of
several other governmental or regulatory bodies. 76 More significantly, em-
ployees can be disqualified if they have been convicted of a felony or mis-
demeanor involving the "purchase or sale of any security, the taking of a
false oath, the making of a false report, bribery, perjury, burgla-
ry, . . . conspiracy to commit any such offense; larceny, theft, robbery, ex-
tortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment, embezzlement,
fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of funds, or securities," 77 or any
other felony in the previous ten years.78 The language of this Act is so ex-
pansive that an individual convicted of shoplifting at eighteen could be
statutorily disqualified from working in the securities industry until the age
of twenty-eight. 79
Although quite broad, the prohibited offenses recognize the im-
portance of the having trustworthy employees in positions that involve
handling important financial instruments. One of the SEC's main functions
71. See SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure 75 Fed Reg. 3594, 3596 (January 21,
2010); Maureen O'Hara, Searching for a New Center: U.S. Securities Markets in Transition,
ECONOMIC REVIEW 37, 38 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Fourth Quarter 2004).
72. O'Hara, supra note 71, at 38.
73. See SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 71, at 3,594.
74. Randall Dodd, Opaque Trades, 47 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 26, 27 (March 2010).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39)(F).
77. § 78o(b)(4).
78. § 78c(a)(39)(F).
79. See § 78c(a)(39)(F); § 78o(b)(4).
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is to protect investors so they feel comfortable investing their money in the
stock market and contributing to an efficient marketplace.80 This is an ex-
tremely important task. Therefore, it is certainly understandable that the
SEC would restrict broker-dealers from hiring individuals convicted of
crimes involving theft or fraud for positions which require handling cash
and securities, just as it would be understandable not to hire a person con-
victed of theft for a position such as a bank teller or cashier, which requires
handling significant amounts of cash.
The SEC established the fingerprinting rule to address the obligations
imposed by Section 15(b)(4)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act. Under
the fingerprint rule, a broker-dealer or member of a securities exchange
must fingerprint all of their associated persons, 81 unless subject to an ex-
emption. 82 The employer must also submit those fingerprints to the Attor-
ney General, or his designee, for a criminal history check. 83 If an
individual's criminal history check uncovers arrests or criminal conviction
records, the details of those arrests are reported back to the broker-dealer. 84
The broker-dealer uses the results of the criminal history report to deter-
mine whether employing the individual would be a violation of Section
15(b)(4)(1). 85 Additionally, the fingerprint rule sets out the following three
limited exemptions to excuse employees from the fingerprint requirement:
(1) individuals who are not engaged in the sale of securities; (2) individuals
who do not regularly have access to the handling or processing of securi-
ties, money, or the original books and records relating to securities or mon-
ey; and (3) individuals who are not responsible for the supervision of the
activities described in the other exceptions.86
The requirements of the fingerprint rule seem to encourage employers
to underutilize the exemptions. First, the rule requires that broker-dealers
follow specific procedures with respect to any employee deemed to be
exempt from the fingerprinting requirement. The broker-dealer must main-
tain a notice of exemption listing each employee for which it is claiming
the exemption, including detailed information about the job functions of
each exempt employee and the procedures taken to ensure the exempt em-
80. SEC, supra note 64.
81. For purposes of this note, associated persons include officers, directors, partners, and employ-
ees.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17f-2 (2010).
83. § 240.17f-2.
84. National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members 05-39: Fingerprinting Proce-
dures, I (May 2005)
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p014265.pdf.
85. Id. at 2.
86. § 240.17f-2(a)(1).
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ployee does not have access to any books and records relating to securities
or money. 87 Further, the broker-dealer must maintain these exemption no-
tices for the life of the company.88
Second, failing to fingerprint someone who does not qualify for an ex-
emption can be a costly risk many employers may be unwilling to take.
Broker-dealers who fail to comply with the fingerprinting requirement of
the SEC may be subject to regulatory action from the SEC or any self-
regulatory organization that conducts examinations of the broker-dealer. 89
In recent years, firms have been fined between $10,000 and $15,000 for
failing to fingerprint all necessary employees. 90 Broker-dealers need to be
diligent about submitting fingerprint records for all necessary employees
because of the significant fines that are assessed for violations of the fin-
gerprint rule and because subsequent violations could result in even higher
penalties.91 Furthermore, trading firms want to be cautious in their evalua-
tion of which positions fall within the requirements of the rule. While an
employer may reasonably believe an employee qualifies for an exemption,
the broker-dealer could be subject to a fine if the self-regulatory organiza-
tion conducting their examination interprets the rule differently. 92
If an employee's fingerprint results reveal a conviction that would
statutorily disqualify the individual, the employer is not flatly prohibited
from continuing to employ the person. The self-regulatory organizations
provide a process through which broker-dealers can request permission for
a statutorily disqualified employee to work in the industry.93 However,
87. § 240.17f-2(e)(1)
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(e)(3).
89. See, e.g., Chicago Board Options Exchange Business Conduct Committee Decision Accepting
Offer of Settlement, Nolita Capital 10-0022 (Aug. 17, 2010),
https://www.cboe.org/publish/DisDecision/10-0022.pdf (assessing fine of $12,500 for failure to finger-
print employees); National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members Disciplinary Actions
and Other Decisions 5 (May 2007) (assessing Geneos Wealth Management a fine of $15,000 for failure
to fingerprint).
90. See Chicago Board Options Exchange Business Conduct Committee supra note 89; Chicago
Board Options Exchange Business Conduct Committee Decision Accepting Offer of Settlement, Cas-
sandra Trading 10-0017 (May 25, 2010), https://www.cboe.org/publishfDisDecision/10-0017.pdf
(assessing fine of $15,000 for failure to fingerprint employees); Chicago Board Options Exchange
Business Conduct Committee Decision Accepting Offer of Settlement, Wolverine Trading LLC, 08-
0053 (Dec. 18, 2008), https://www.cboe.org/publish/DisDecision/08-0053.pdf (assessing fine of
$10,000 for failure to fingerprint); National Associate of Securities Dealers, supra note 89.
91. Regulators generally assess higher fines for repeated violations of the same rule in order to
deter future violations. See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Sanction Guidelines 2 (2010),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enfl@sg/documents/industry/pO 1 1038.pdf.
92. For fines relating to failure to fingerprinting employees, see Chicago Board Options Exchange
Business Conduct Committee supra note 89; National Association of Securities Dealers, supra note 89.
93. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 9522(e)(2), SR-NASD-97-28 (Effec-
tive Aug. 1997); FINRA Rule 9523, SR-NASD-99-76 (Effective Sept. 11, 2000).
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there is little incentive for employers to subject themselves to the complex
authorization process to retain a statutorily disqualified individual. The
process requires application to the appropriate self-regulatory organization,
including a possible hearing on the matter, is subject to the discretion of the
self-regulatory organization, and if approved, requires the employer to
institute special supervision requirements with respect to the employee in
question. 94 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), one of
the primary self-regulatory organizations in the securities industry, reports
only eleven statutory disqualification decisions in the past four years relat-
ing to individuals with criminal histories.95 In nine of those decisions,
FINRA did authorize the employee to work for a broker-dealer subject to
heightened supervision requirements specified by FINRA. 96 FINRA denied
the two other applications requesting approval to work despite a statutory
disqualification. 97 As the rule currently stands, the best alternative for em-
ployers is to fingerprint nearly all employees and refuse to hire anyone
deemed statutorily disqualified.
94. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 9522(e)(2), SR-NASD-97-28 (Effec-
tive August 1997); FINRA Rule 9523, SR-NASD-99-76 (Effective Sept. 11, 2000).
95. See FINRA National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD08001 (2008),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p 117871.pdf;
FINRA National Adjudicatory Council Decision SDO7003 (2007),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p037826.pdf;
FINRA National Adjudicatory Council Decision SDO7001 (2007),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p037824.pdf;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06015 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036488.pdf;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06012 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036477.pdf;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06011 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036486.pdf
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06010 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036485.pdf;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06009 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036484.pdf
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06006 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036483.pdf;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06005 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036482.pdf;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06002 (2006),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/nacdecisions/p036476.pdf.
96. See FINRA National Adjudicatory Council Decision SDO8001, supra note 95; FINRA Na-
tional Adjudicatory Council Decision SD07003, supra note 95; FINRA National Adjudicatory Council
Decision SD07001, supra note 95; NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06015, supra
note 95; NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06011, supra note 95; NASD National
Adjudicatory Council Decision SDO6010 , supra note 95; NASD National Adjudicatory Council Deci-
sion SD06009, supra note 95; NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06006, supra note 95;
NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06005, supra note 95.
97. See NASD National Adjudicatory Council Decision SDO6012, supra note 95; NASD National
Adjudicatory Council Decision SD06002, supra note 95.
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C. Application of the Fingerprint Rule
The fingerprint rule was enacted in 1982 and, although the industry
has since shifted to a heavily electronic environment, 98 the rule has re-
mained essentially unchanged since first enacted. 99 The rule seems to be
outdated in today's modem environment. Presume, for example, that a
twenty-six-year-old African American man wishes to apply for a job as a
computer programmer at a New York City trading firm. He has a college
degree in computer programming and several years of relevant experience
working as a computer programmer in another industry. Suppose that this
young man was convicted of theft at eighteen years old, but has not had any
legal problems since high school. At first glance, this young man may look
like an ideal candidate for some employers in the securities industry.
Unfortunately for this young job applicant, his criminal conviction
places the broker-dealer in a predicament. The electronic evolution of the
securities markets not only changed the market structure, but also vastly
altered the job functions of employees at broker-dealers. Previously, an
employer could easily identify who had a key to the safe or a filing cabinet.
However, employers may no longer be able to easily determine which
computer programmers on staff might be viewed as having access to books
and records.
When a trading system functions completely electronically, a firm
might have certain programmers who create and maintain the systems that
decide to send the order to purchase stock, other programmers who create
and maintain the systems which translate those orders into the program-
ming language used by a particular stock exchange, other programmers
who maintain the database which stores all the trading data the firm is obli-
gated to retain, and still other programmers who design and run trading
reports to assist management in monitoring trading behavior. Likewise,
information technology personnel, who are responsible for resolving
equipment issues, may also have access to systems containing trade data.
All such employees could be said to have access to books and records relat-
ing to securities or monies and therefore may be subject to the fingerprint
rule.100 Yet, the job roles described above could easily encompass most of
the departments in a trading firm.
98. See Pankaj K. Jain, Financial Market Design and the Equity Premium: Electronic versus
Floor Trading, 60 JOUR. FIN. 2955, 2965 (2005) (stating that most exchanges now operate fully elec-
tronically).




Unfortunately, trading firms may be forced to reject this hypothetical
job applicant, solely on the basis of his criminal conviction, because any
computer programming position the applicant could be hired for would
likely involve accessing the firm's "books and records relating to securities
and monies."101 Employers are left with few alternatives even if it is clear
that the job applicant is not a risk to the firm or its customers. The employ-
er can reject the otherwise qualified applicant, try to create a job role that
she is confident would be exempt under the fingerprint rule and maintain
the necessary exemption paperwork for the employee, or apply for authori-
zation from her self-regulatory organization to employ the statutorily dis-
qualified person. Unfortunately for job applicants with criminal
backgrounds, the least burdensome option for the employer is to simply
reject the applicant and look for another candidate without a criminal histo-
ry.
Broker-dealers are placed in a situation that encourages them to com-
ply with the fingerprint rule in an overly broad manner because the SEC's
fingerprint rule has not evolved along with the technological changes in the
industry. This is especially true since the language of 17f-2 provides ample
room for interpretation as to what constitutes access to the books and rec-
ords, monies, or securities. 102 Moreover, the SEC discourages narrow ap-
plication of the rule by placing the burden on employers to justify to their
regulator why an individual is exempt. 103 An employer may reasonably
believe that her receptionist clearly falls within the exemption to the rule
and therefore would not be required to be fingerprinted.104 However, if the
receptionist's responsibilities include opening business-related mail, then
the employee may be subject to the fingerprinting rule. 05
Further, even if the employer is confident that certain job functions are
justifiably exempt from the fingerprint requirement, the employer is still
faced with the burden of maintaining the appropriate documentation to
defend the exemption. 106 The employer must keep its exemption notices
updated for any employees it opts not to fingerprint and must ensure that
employees are subsequently fingerprinted if their job responsibilities
change such that they become subject to the rule. 107 Employers are encour-
aged to submit fingerprints for nearly all employees and to refuse to em-
101. § 240.17f-2(a)(1).
102. See § 240.17f-2(a)(1)(i).
103. See § 240.17f-2(a)(1); § 240.17f-2(e).
104. See § 240.17f-2(a)(1).
105. Id.
106. § 240.17f-2(e).
107. See § 240.17f-2(a)(1); see also § 240.17f-2(e).
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ploy anyone that is statutorily disqualified because of the burden created by
the fingerprinting rule.
III. THE FINGERPRINT RULE'S POTENTIAL DISPARATE IMPACT ON
MINORITIES
Not only are the procedural matters involved with the fingerprint rule
a burden to employers in the securities industry, but complying with the
rule may also subject the employer to Title VII liability. The EEOC's rec-
ommendations for employers using criminal background checks as an em-
ployment screening practice are aimed at avoiding the disparate impact
such practices can have on African Americans and Hispanics. 08 Yet, as
discussed above, the SEC's fingerprint rule provides few alternatives for
employers in the securities industry. The required use of criminal back-
ground checks in the securities industry, the low employment rates for Af-
rican Americans and Hispanics in the securities industry,109 and the high
criminal conviction rates amongst these populationsl o give rise to an infer-
ence that the fingerprint rule may have a disparate impact on minorities.
Additionally, the technological changes that have occurred over the past
three decades in the securities industry have likely weakened any argument
that the fingerprint requirement meets the standards for a business necessity
defense, 1 1 or that an alternative non-discriminatory method of screening is
unavailable.112
Further, employers in the securities industry may believe that they
would be protected from Title VII liability since the fingerprinting re-
quirement is an SEC regulation with which they must comply. While that
may garner some sympathy and understanding from the courts, it is not
likely to provide employers a complete defense to Title VII liability. Fortu-
nately, the SEC is in the position to relieve the burden the fingerprint rule
places on employers by narrowing the scope of the rule so it better suits
how the industry operates in today's electronic environment.
108. See EEOC, supra note 46; EEOC, supra note 38, at 1.
109. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, (focusing on table 18) (Dept. of
Labor 2010) (noting that African-Americans and Hispanics combined hold less than 10 percent of job
positions in the securities industry).
I10. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 14.




A. Adverse Impact on Minorities
To establish an adverse impact on a protected class of people, a plain-
tiff must identify the employment practice at issue and demonstrate the
connection between the practice and the adverse impact on the protected
class.' 13 An adverse impact may be suggested when the percentage of mi-
norities employed in the jobs at issue is significantly disproportionate to the
percentage of minorities in the surrounding community.11 4 The Third Cir-
cuit upheld a district court's finding that a residency requirement caused an
adverse impact because the percentage of minorities hired was extremely
low as compared to the minority population in the local geographic area. 115
While statistical evidence from the actual pool of applicants or qualified
labor pool may best demonstrate the connection between the employment
practice and the adverse impact, such evidentiary support may not always
be available to demonstrate a direct correlation between the employment
practice and its adverse impact on minority groups.
With respect to the securities industry, the percentage of minorities
employed in the industry is significantly disproportionate to the available
labor pool. The current population survey for 2010 found that African
Americans and Hispanics comprise only 5.3 and 4.6 percent of job posi-
tions, respectively, in the securities, commodities, funds, trust, and other
financial investments categories.1 6 Over 80 percent, or four-fifths, of job
positions in the securities industry are filled by white or non-minority per-
sons. 117 In comparison, in New York City, the financial center of U.S. se-
curities markets, African Americans comprised 26.6 percent of the
population and Hispanics comprised 27 percent of the overall population as
of 2006.118 Although the entire minority population is not necessarily rep-
resentative of the qualified labor pool for the securities industry and New
York City serves as only one example of a relevant population, the statis-
tics do provide insight into the dramatic disparity between the representa-
113. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658,
2673 (2009).
114. See Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Harrison, N.J., 940 F.2d. 792, 799-801 (3d Cir.
1991). Generally, the evaluation of the statistical disparity focuses specifically on the relevant labor
market. Id at 798.
115. Id To support its holding, the court stated that "[iut would be hard to conclude that among the
very substantial number of black workers in the four county labor market there are not a large number
of persons qualified to serve as police officers, fire fighters, clerk typists and laborers." Id at 799.
116. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 109.
117. Asian employees comprise 8.0 percent of positions bringing the total for all three minority
racial groups to 17.9 percent. Id.
118. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts New York (city), NY (Modified Aug.16,
2010), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html.
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tion of these minority groups in a relevant population and their representa-
tions in the securities industry.
Further, the lack of minorities in professional or management posi-
tions in the industry is striking. The majority of positions in the financial
services industry are professional and management level.' 19 Yet, in the
securities industry, African Americans comprise only 4.4 percent of official
or management positions and only 7 percent of professional positions.120
Similarly, Hispanic employees represent only 2.9 percent of official or
management positions and only 4.4 percent of professional positions.121
The limited presence of minorities in the financial services industry
has even garnered the attention of Congress. In May 2010, Orice Williams
Brown, the Director of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
Financial Markets and Community Investment Team, testified before the
Subcommittees on Oversight and Investigations and Housing Community
Opportunity and the House Committee on Financial Services about the
GAO's study on management-level diversity in the financial services in-
dustry.122 Mr. Brown testified that although many financial services firms
initiated diversity programs in the mid-1990s, there has not been any sig-
nificant change in diversity in management positions in the financial ser-
vices industry.123 Recruitment and retention issues were noted as
contributing factors for the lack of minorities in management-level posi-
tions. 124 It seems logical that few minorities would have the opportunity for
promotion into management-level positions given that they hold so few
positions within the industry overall. Increasing the presence of minorities
in the industry overall would likely facilitate their increased presence in
management positions.
Ultimately, these statistics should raise questions as to whether the use
of criminal background checks as an employment screening tool in the
securities industry has an adverse impact on African Americans and His-
panics due to the prevalence of criminal convictions in those communities.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that per every 100,000 people, the
imprisonment rate for African American men is 3,161 and for Hispanic
119. EEOC, DIVERSITY IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 3 (2006).
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 8.
122. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-736T, FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY:
OVERALL TRENDS IN MANAGEMENT-LEVEL DIVERSITY AND DIVERSITY INITIATIVES, 1993-2008, 1, 3
(May 12, 2010).
123. Id. at 7-10.
124. Id. atI 1-12.
2012] 317
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
men the rate is 1,200 as compared to 487 for white men. 125 These numbers
reflect incarceration rates that are nearly 6.5 and 2.5 times higher for Afri-
can American and Hispanic men, respectively, as compared to white men.
Moreover, these figures demonstrate the increased likelihood for an Afri-
can American or Hispanic man to have a criminal conviction as compared
to a white man. With minority populations rapidly increasing as a percent-
age of the overall population in the United States,126 the fact that their rep-
resentation in the securities industry remains extremely low raises an
inference that African Americans and Hispanics are adversely impacted by
an employment practice that excludes individuals based on criminal con-
victions. 127
B. The Fingerprint Rule is Too Broad to Support a Business Necessity
Defense.
The evolution of the securities markets to an electronic trading envi-
ronment and the broad application of the fingerprint rule no longer support
a business necessity defense. When the SEC first enacted the fingerprint
requirement in 1982,128 the job roles to which the fingerprint rule applied
were likely apparent and logical. Traders worked on the exchange floor and
manually completed trading cards to document their transactions. 129 Gen-
erally, customers deposited money into their brokerage accounts by cash or
check.130 Representatives often received customer orders via phone and
manually documented those transactions.131 Stock certificates were physi-
cally transferred via messenger 32 and held for safekeeping by the firm in a
125. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 14.
126. U.S. Census Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 4
(March 2011).
127. Additional factors may also contribute to the low presence of minorities in the securities
industry. A history of direct discrimination may contribute to lingering attitudes in hiring decisions. See
Halah Touryalai, Our Diversity Problem, REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE (Mar 1, 2006),
http://registeredrep.com/mag/finance-diversityproblem. Additionally, lack of participation in the
industry overall may be indicative of limited knowledge about the industry and may also lead to fewer
employment opportunities as financial professionals tend to reach out most often to persons similar to
themselves. See Louise Marie Roth, Bringing Clients Back In: Homophily Preferences and Inequality
on Wall Street, 45 SOCIOLOGY QUARTERLY 613, 621 (2004); GREGORY S. BELL, IN THE BLACK: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS ON WALL STREET 4-5 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17f-2 (2010).
129. VIRGINIA B. MORRIs & STEWARD Z. GOLDSTEIN, GUIDE TO CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT 5
(Light Bulb Press 2009).
130. See Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K.Walton II., The Use of Checks and Other Non-Cash Pay-
ment Instruments in the United States, FED. RES. BULLETIN 360 (August 2002) (nothing that check use
in the United States has declined since the mid-1990s as electronic transactions have increased).
131. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 147 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
132. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 129, at 4.
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vault or safe. 133 Trading cards, checks, cash, and stock certificates are val-
uable items and anyone handling them needed to be trustworthy. Employ-
ers could almost certainly make the case that the fingerprint rule was a
business necessity to protect customer and firm money and to ensure that
the securities, monies, and books and records handled by these employees
remained safe.
However, as discussed above, the fingerprint rule can be interpreted as
applying to nearly all job functions at a trading firm in today's electronic
environment. The transition to an electronic workplace has broadened the
number of positions that interact with trade information while also facilitat-
ing electronic safeguards to prevent against the misappropriation of valua-
bles or information. The clearance and settlement of securities involves the
electronic transfer of stock between firms through the clearing organiza-
tions and no longer requires the physical delivery of stock certificates.134
Likewise, transferring money between bank accounts or customer trading
accounts is now primarily done in an electronic fashion. 135 As a result,
trading firms rarely handle cash or physical stock certificates.136 Trading
firms are able to limit access to funds and to require multiple levels of ap-
proval for transfers between accounts through the use of electronic con-
trols.137 Electronic order entry, by customers or firms, takes much of the
trading responsibility away from the individual trader in exchange for a
more standardized and controlled format. 138 Further, customers and man-
agement have near real-time access to account information to verify that
activity in trading accounts is consistent with their requests.139 With all the
changes that have occurred in the industry, a broker-dealer would have
difficulty establishing the business necessity of criminal background
checks for every job role at a trading firm.
133. DOUGLAS W. KURTZ & DAWN K. RHODES, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL 133-134 (Prentice Hall 1992).
134. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 129, at 5.
135. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD SYSTEM, THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENT STUDY: A SURVEY OF
ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS FOR THE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 18, 21 (March 2008)
(finding the number of automated clearing house transactions, such as direct deposits, electronic checks,
and electronic bill payment, increased 18.6 percent to 14.6 billion between 2003 and 2006).
136. See MORRIs & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 129, at 7.
137. KURTZ & RHODES, supra note 133, at 13.
138. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First, 15 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 455, 461 (2002) (stating that online investment systems allow customers to place orders
without a broker serving as an intermediary and such systems give customers a greater sense of con-
trol).




To maintain a strong business necessity defense, the EEOC recom-
mends that employers evaluate the use of criminal background checks in
terms of the type of job and the nature and seriousness of the offense.140
The securities industry's application of the fingerprint rule is hardly limited
in this respect given the plethora of crimes included in the definition of
statutory disqualification. A wide range of offenses are covered by the stat-
utory language, including misdemeanors involving larceny, theft, robbery,
extortion, forgery, or embezzlement, 141 and any felony in the past ten
years.142 While serious offenses on their face, one could imagine how a
conviction for misdemeanor theft could be a misunderstanding or mistake
from which the individual has learned. Likewise, a felony conviction for a
crime completely unrelated to dishonesty or theft, such as felony driving
under the influence or drug possession, may be evidence of a past personal
issue for the individual, but not necessarily a reflection of their ability to be
a competent employee. Moreover, the past conviction may have led the
employee to seek treatment for their issues and may not represent their
current state of recovery. A broad exclusion based on past criminal convic-
tions does not provide employers the opportunity to make individualized
judgments about their employees.143 Employers would be in a stronger
position to demonstrate their compliance with Title VII if the SEC allowed
the employers more flexibility to evaluate the specific facts and circum-
stances of an individual's criminal history when making an employment
decision.
Despite the EEOC's recommendations that employers consider the se-
riousness of the offense and the length of time since the offense oc-
curred,144 there is little the SEC can do to limit the offenses covered or the
ten-year timeframe because those were set by Congress in the Securities
Exchange Act.145 However, the SEC's inability to limit the applicable of-
fenses or timeframe makes it even more important that the SEC narrowly
tailor the rule to apply only to the job functions where a criminal conviction
would create an unacceptable level of risk for the broker-dealer.
The EEOC also recommends that employers frequently reevaluate the
relevance of a background check requirement as job roles evolve. 146 The
securities industry is not the same business it was in 1982, but the rule re-
140. EEOC, supra note 46.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39)(F) (2006).
143. See EEOC, supra note 46.
144. Id.
145. See § 78o(b)(4); § 78c(a)(39)(F).
146. EEOC, supra note 38, at 5.
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mains unchanged. As a result, the rule has essentially swallowed the ex-
emptions and created a requirement that nearly all personnel be subject to a
criminal background check. 147
Finally, Title VII provides that a business necessity defense can be
overcome by demonstrating there is an alternative, less discriminatory
method that can achieve the same business-related result.148 The current
application of the rule leaves employers vulnerable to arguments about less
discriminatory alternatives, many of which place additional, unnecessary
burdens on the employers. For example, an employer that wishes to avoid
Title VII liability could structure her trading systems and processes to en-
sure that a number of job roles have no access to any data that would fall
within the requirements of the rule. However, this may require the employ-
er to restructure how departments or computer networks operate. The em-
ployer also may need to restrict the non-fingerprinted employees' access to
firm computer systems so as to avoid the possibility of unintended access
to information. Further, the employer may need to refrain from assigning
specific tasks to the individuals she has decided not to fingerprint. In addi-
tion to the logistical problems this decision could create, the employer
would be obligated to maintain proper documentation to demonstrate the
exemption from the fingerprint rule is valid.149
C. The Regulatory Requirement Defense
The issue of whether the fingerprint requirement causes a disparate
impact under Title VII has not yet become a large issue for the securities
industry. Employers might assume that the judicial system would not hold
them liable for something they are required by a federal agency to do. Cer-
tainly, employers in the securities industry are not alone in facing the pre-
dicament of conflicting regulatory obligations being imposed by separate
agencies of the federal government. 50 While federal agencies are encour-
147. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17f-2 (2010).
148. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 240-241 (3d Cir. 2007).
149. § 240.17f-2(e)(1).
150. See Letter from Senators Maria Cantwell and Patty Murray and Congressmen Adam Smith,
Dave Rechert, Jay Inslee, and Jim McDermott to Army Corps of Engineers (June 7, 2010),
http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/060710 ArmyCorpsLeveeLetter.pdf (regarding new rules prohibit-




aged to evaluate the potential for conflict prior to enacting rules,151 con-
flicting agency regulations continue to cause problems.152
Unfortunately, there is no efficient federal process to resolve conflict-
ing regulatory obligations.153 These conflicts may occur because the incon-
sistencies are not readily apparent until the regulations are implemented or,
as in the case of the fingerprint rule, because the conflict arises as a result
of changes in the applicable industry. Those subject to the conflicting regu-
lations often remain trapped by interagency conflicts until Congress acts,
one of the agencies amends their regulations to undo the existing conflict,
or an individual case reaches the judicial system so that the courts can
weigh in on the matter.154 In evaluating agency action, courts are hesitant
to overturn agency decisions but will do so if the agency failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem.155
There is no federal regulation prohibiting use of criminal background
checks in employment decisions or specifying how Title VII applies to
these policies. While the fingerprint rule is a regulation promulgated by the
SEC, in contrast, the EEOC guidance on criminal background checks is
only an agency interpretation as to what may constitute a disparate impact
under Title VII. The courts have not directly spoken as to whether broad
use of criminal background checks can create a disparate impact against
African Americans and Hispanics. However, there are several cases cur-
rently pending that specifically address the issue.156 If the courts determine
that a broad practice of disqualifying job applicants based on a past crimi-
nal conviction can have a disparate impact on African Americans and His-
panics, employers in the securities industry may be faced with a regulatory
obligation under the fingerprint rule that violates Title VII.
Certainly, employers in the securities industry could await a lawsuit
by rejected job applicants to determine how courts would balance the regu-
latory obligation established by the SEC against a judicial interpretation as
151. See Exec. Order No. 13497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009) (removing President Bush's
amendments to Executive Order #12866); Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993)
(setting out procedures for planning and review of new and existing federal regulations).
152. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007) (ad-
dressing potential conflict between Clean Water Act and Endanger Species Act of 1973); Letter from
Senators Maria Cantwell et al., supra note 152.
153. Norman L. Rave, Jr., Interagency Conflict and Administrative Accountability: Regulation the
Release ofRecombinant Organisms, 77 GEO. L. J. 1787, 1810 (1988-1989).
154. Id.
155. Nat'lAss'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 658; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
156. See Complaint, EEOC v. Freeman Companies, supra note 10, at 3-4; Compliant, EEOC v.
Peoplemark, supra note 10, at 2; Complaint Hudson, supra note 63, at 1; Complaint, Arroyo supra note
63, at 4.
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to what constitutes a disparate impact under Title VII. While the courts
may have sympathy for the predicament faced by the employers in the se-
curities industry, it is unlikely the courts would imply an exemption into
Title VII for the securities industry. Presumably, the courts would wish to
avoid create differing standards for different types of employers with re-
spect to Title VII. In creating a different standard under Title VII for one
industry the courts may open a Pandora's Box as other types of employers
in a similar predicament would also seek an exemption for criminal back-
ground checks.' 57 The more employers who become exempt from the dis-
parate impact provision of Title VII, the weaker the provision would
become. Further, it is unlikely that the court would relieve a broker-dealer
of all liability to the injured party in the case, even if the court were sympa-
thetic to the employer's predicament. The non-discriminatory alternatives
factor in Title VII leaves broker-dealers vulnerable to creative arguments
from plaintiffs about steps the employer should take to minimize the dis-
criminatory intent of the fingerprint rule, even if most alternatives would be
extremely burdensome to the employer. However, the SEC is in the posi-
tion to amend the language of the fingerprint rule to bring it within the
business necessity exemption of Title VII.158
IV. THE SEC SHOULD AMEND THE FINGERPRINT RULE To EASE
THE BURDEN ON EMPLOYERS.
The fingerprint rule should be amended so it continues to ensure the
good character and trustworthiness of employees in positions that directly
handle funds and securities, without unnecessarily excluding a sub-set of
African Americans and Hispanics from working in the securities industry.
The SEC is responsible for ensuring the intent of Congress, as set forth in
the Securities Exchange Act and other relevant laws, is carried out and
adapted to the address technological changes in the market.159 By re-
evaluating the job functions that require fingerprinting, the SEC could limit
the impact of these disqualifications to only those positions to which they
are truly relevant. Additionally, the SEC could modify the language of the
rule to relieve the recordkeeping burden on employers who wish to utilize
the fingerprint rule's exemptions. The SEC is in the position to adapt the
157. For example, the Department of Homeland Security, banks, and transit agencies all may be
subject to apparently conflicting obligations with respect to pre-employment screening.
158. See SEC, supra note 64 (focusing on insert How the SEC Rule Making Process Works).
Agency responsibilities include engaging in rule making to ensure the intent of Congress continues to
be carried out as technology evolves.
159. SEC, supra note 71.
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language of the rule to bring it within the business necessity defense of
Title VII and alleviate the burden on employers of determining how to
comply with competing statutory and regulatory obligations.
Section (a)(1) of the fingerprint rule provides exemptions for persons
who are not engaged in the sale of securities, do not regularly have access
to the "keeping, handling, or processing of securities, monies or the origi-
nal books and records relating to the securities or the monies," and do not
directly supervise persons engaged in the activities referred to above.160
This rule addresses important concerns that individuals handing valuable
items, such as money and stock certificates, are trustworthy individuals.
The general intent of the rule certainly has merit, particularly with respect
to employees that are charged with handling customers' money and securi-
ties. However, the fingerprint rule must be evaluated from a new perspec-
tive in light of the technological advancements of recent decades. Any
individual that physically handles cash or physical stock certificates and
any employee that directly makes trading decisions should still require
fingerprinting. Likewise, any individual who can access trading or bank
accounts with authority to move money should continue to fall within the
requirements of the rule. The securities industry should be able to establish
that background checks are vital to these job rolesl6' and necessary to en-
sure the trustworthy performance of these jobs.162 Additionally, the securi-
ties industry's argument that criminal background checks are a business
necessity for certain jobs becomes stronger when the policy is applied in a
limited fashion, as opposed to the current, broad application.163
Further, the SEC would likely have sufficient justification to continue
fingerprinting executive officers of broker-dealers. Those positions remain
of particular concern in light of the scandals over the past few decades
involving company management misleading investors or producing decep-
tive financial statements. 164 The argument that background checks on indi-
viduals serving in these capacities is a business necessity is certainly viable
and could likely withstand a Title VII challenge.
The SEC may also wish to consider whether advisors soliciting cus-
tomers and providing investment advice to the public should be required to
be fingerprinted. Although these roles do not necessarily provide the em-
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17f-2(a)(1) (2010).
161. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
308 F.3d 286, 289 (3d Cir. 2002).
162. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998-99 (1988).
163. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that general or
overly broad application of background check policies will not meet the business necessity standard).
164. Examples include the collapse of Enron and WorldCom.
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ployees with direct access to funds or securities, an argument could be
made about the importance of the creditability and trustworthiness of these
individuals. This concern would rise from the reliance of the general public
on the advice of these employees.
While these categories do not necessarily provide a complete list of
the job roles that may justify the background check requirement, they do
demonstrate the level of specificity with which the SEC should tailor the
rule. In doing do, the SEC will eliminate numerous job roles from the fin-
gerprint requirement that have no interaction with funds or physical securi-
ties. 165 Additionally, these changes will refocus the rule to its original
intent. By dramatically narrowing the scope of the fingerprint rule, the SEC
could diminish the strength of disparate impact claims against employers in
the industry. Many more job roles would be available to persons with mi-
nor criminal histories and a stronger business necessity defense could be
established for the positions that remain affected.
Moreover, the SEC should carefully consider comments from the se-
curities industry prior to implementing any change. The industry will be
able to provide important information about the changes that have occurred
in handling and processing money and securities. Specifically, the industry
can provide a detailed picture of the job functions that provide individuals
with access to funds or securities or the ability to place trades, as opposed
to jobs that provide only peripheral access to trade data and are not in a
position to misappropriate funds or securities in any way.
Further, the SEC should consider amending the language of the rule to
specify the categories of person who require fingerprinting as opposed to
providing exemptions for those who will not require fingerprinting. Even if
the SEC tailors the exemptions to exclude additional job roles from the
requirement, employers may still feel inclined to fingerprint most employ-
ees because of the paperwork burden of justifying an exemption. Employ-
ers in the securities industry can employ hundreds or thousands of
employees.166 Maintaining detailed paperwork as to why each one is ex-
empt from the fingerprint rule is not practical and employers would likely
find it more efficient to continue fingerprinting all employees. By amend-
ing the language of the rule to describe which employees are required to be
printed, the SEC would relieve the burden on employers of maintaining
165. Examples include, but are not limited to, administrative personnel, information technology
staff, and human resources employees.
166. See Annual Ranking ofAmerica's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 23, 2011,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/201 1/industries/1 87/index.html (reporting that




exemption documentation for those employees who are not required to be
fingerprinted.
Finding the precise language that achieves a balance between the
Congressional intent of the Securities Exchange Act, practical application
for employers, and Title VII compliance will not be an easy task. However,
a thorough understanding of how technology has transformed the securities
industry in recent years is essential. The SEC also has the burden of ensur-
ing the public remains confident in the individuals working at trading firms
so they will continue to invest their money in the stock market or seeking
guidance from financial professionals. Prior to undertaking this task, the
SEC should consider how trading firms operate in the new electronic mar-
ketplace, how technology has changed the processes and functions of in-
dustry employees, how technology has provided additional controls and
checks on access to money and securities, and what customers believe are
important job roles to include in the rule. The SEC should then update the
fingerprint rule to reflect the electronic nature of the markets and alleviate
the predicament currently faced by employers in the industry.
CONCLUSION
Employers in the securities industry are caught in a catch-22. They are
required by SEC Rule 17f-2 to fingerprint nearly all of their employees and
disqualify individuals from employment if they have a criminal conviction
for any number of misdemeanors or any felony within the past ten years.
While facially such a requirement may appear valid and even a good busi-
ness practice, the EEOC believes a broad policy of excluding job applicants
based on criminal convictions may violate Title VII. Specifically, the
EEOC believes these policies have a disparate impact on African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics since these minority groups have high rates of criminal
convictions. While disparate impact claims depend heavily on the facts of
the specific case, employers in the securities industry certainly should be
concerned about their potential liability with respect to Title VII and the
SEC's fingerprint rule. Minority representation in the securities industry is
so low that a valid inference can be raised as to whether the industry's fin-
gerprinting requirement has a disparate impact on minorities in violation of
Title VII.
The SEC can alleviate the potential liability that the fingerprint rule
creates for employers by amending the language of the fingerprint rule to
better reflect its intended purpose. Electronic trading and the use of com-
puters for handling nearly all aspects of business have dramatically altered
the job functions of trading firm employees as compared to when the fin-
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gerprint rule was first enacted. The SEC should feel obligated to the em-
ployers operating in the securities industry to update the language of the
fingerprint rule to bring it within the business necessity defense of Title
VIi's disparate impact provision. Narrowing the language of the rule will
relieve the burden on employers and will contribute to diversifying the
securities industry by opening up job opportunities to a wider array of peo-
ple.

